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Wrong on Red: The Constitutional Case against  
Red-Light Cameras 
Joel O. Christensen  
INTRODUCTION 
Though the marriage of surveillance technology and law 
enforcement hardly is a new phenomenon, the twenty-first century 
has proven to be a brave new world in this realm. Through 
partnerships with MindCite,
1
 police in Israel, Africa, and Southeast 
Asia
2
 now expeditiously process public and private Internet 
communications for leads to potential inchoate criminal activity.
3
 
Great Britain employs Automatic Number Plate Recognition 
(―ANPR‖) technology,4 which allows police to capture digital images 
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 1. MindCite Home Page, http://www.mindcite.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2009). 
MindCite technology allows law enforcement personnel to ―explore and unearth knowledge 
hidden in numerous diverse sources on the web in the sites and the blogs as well as in the 
organization in the various databases and turn their volumes of information into . . . Actionable 
Intelligence.‖ Id. 
 2. MindCite—Customers, http://www.mindcite.com/customers (last visited Sept. 18, 
2009).  
 3. David Shamah, The Next Best Thing to Jack, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 25, 2009, at 15. 
MindCite‘s self-described ―ontology-based platform,‖ Mindcite—About Us, http://www. 
mindcite.com/about (last visited Apr. 19, 2010), accumulates public and private 
communications from the Internet ―to determine the hidden relationships between entities and 
cases.‖ Shamah, supra, at 15. Shamah describes MindCite technology as the real-world 
alternative to ―24‘s‖ Jack Bauer. Id. 
 4. Helen Wells, The Techno-Fix Versus the Fair Cop: Procedural (In)Justice and 
Automated Speed Limit Enforcement, 48 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 798, 799 (2008). 
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of passing vehicles‘ license plates and instantly verify compliance 
with registration and insurance requirements.
5
 In the United States, 
law enforcement departments increasingly have turned to a different 
form of surveillance technology: red-light cameras.
6
 Red-light 
cameras are affixed to traffic lights and are positioned to capture 
aerial photographs of offending vehicles as they pass through 
intersections.
7
 According to American Traffic Solutions, one of the 
nation‘s leading red-light camera providers, the license plate 
photographs ―contain all the information needed to prosecute a red-
light violation.‖8 
At first blush, red-light cameras raise small-scale questions 
regarding the instrumentalities of traffic law, but closer inspection 
reveals that deeply substantive considerations underlie a 
municipality‘s decision to incorporate camera technology into its 
enforcement apparatus. Proponents of red-light cameras highlight 
their purported efficacy: red-light cameras are administratively 
convenient and arguably enhance safety,
9
 though the latter claim is 
far from universally accepted.
10
 Advocates claim that any incidental 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. See generally American Traffic Solutions Red-Light Camera Systems, http://www. 
atsol.com/services-public-safety-red-light.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).  
 7. Id. ―The first image shows the vehicle with the front wheels behind the stop bar and 
the illuminated red light, and the second image shows the vehicle in the intersection with the 
rear wheels past the stop bar and an illuminated red light.‖ Id. ATS cameras are not configured 
to capture images of drivers. Id. ATS‘s leading competitor, Redflex Traffic Systems, is the 
other company with whom American municipalities generally contract for red-light camera 
systems. Redflex boasts that it ―has more contracts in more states than any other vendor.‖ 
Redflex Traffic Systems—About Us, http://www.redflex.com/html/usa/about (last visited Apr. 
19, 2010). For purposes of this Note, ATS technology and methodology is of greatest relevance, 
as Redflex services only five Missouri municipalities, whereas ATS services twenty-seven 
localities in the state. Compare Redflex Traffic Systems—North American Presence, 
http://www.redflex.com/html/usa/index.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2010), with American Traffic 
Solutions—ATS Contracts, http://www.atsol.com/about-us-our-clients-contracts.html (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2010). 
 8. American Traffic Solutions Red-Light Camera Systems, http://www.atsol.com/ 
services-public-safety-red-light.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2010). Importantly, ATS cameras 
capture photographs only of the vehicle‘s license plate, not its driver. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., Steven Tafoya Naumchik, Stop! Photographic Enforcement of Red Lights, 
30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 833, 852 (1999) (maintaining, with regard to the safety benefits of red-
light cameras in California, ―positive statistical results . . . are undisputed.‖). 
 10. Numerous studies have indicated that, while red-light cameras reduce the incidence of 
certain accidents (i.e., frontal collisions), they increase rear-end collisions, sideswipes, and 
accidents involving vehicles turning left. See, e.g., Del Quentin Wilber & Derek Willis, D.C. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/13
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legal implications of automated camera technology are part of life in 
the new millennium.
11
 To red-light camera critics, however, the 
specter of Big Brother looms large.
12
 In no other context have 
traditional, face-to-face enforcement methods been so thoroughly 
dispensed with in favor of automated technology. As one 
commentator noted, in municipalities with red-light cameras, ―[t]he 
entire traffic enforcement process is almost untouched by human 
hands.‖13 Despite growing resistance from scholars,14 politicians,15 
 
Red-Light Cameras Fail to Reduce Accidents, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2005, at A1. Indeed, traffic-
camera detractors argue zealously and persuasively that an overemphasis on the purported 
safety benefits of camera technology diverts attention from more pressing causes of roadway 
accidents. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., The War on Short Yellows, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2009, at 
A13. Jenkins notes: 
Red-light running and speeding, the two main uses of traffic cameras, are implicated in 
fewer than 8% of accidents. A far more prevalent cause of nondrunken accidents is 
driver inattention—one study estimated, in a typical case the driver‘s eyes are diverted 
from the road for a full three seconds or more, fidgeting with a cellphone, disciplining 
the kids in the back seat, snoozing, blotting up spilled coffee, etc. 
Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Andrew W.J. Tarr, Recent Development, Picture It: Red Light Cameras 
Abide by the Law of the Land, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1879 (2002) (submitting that Charlotte, North 
Carolina‘s ―SafeLight‖ ordinance satisfies constitutional objections while augmenting roadway 
safety). 
 12. See, e.g., Bob Barr, Are Police Wrong to Use Red-Light Cameras to Enforce Traffic 
Laws?, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Sept. 10, 2001, at 40. Representative Barr frames the red-light 
camera issue as whether communities should ―allow technology to trump the Bill of Rights by 
placing surveillance cameras on roadways and street corners to gather evidence to convict 
citizens in courts without the procedural safeguards heretofore available[.]‖ Id. He concludes 
that compelling ―public-policy arguments against Big-Brother surveillance,‖ coupled with the 
lack of meaningful consideration given to less-intrusive alternatives, militates against the 
continued installation and operation of red-light cameras. Id. at 42. 
 13. Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 295, 319 (2004). 
 14. Academics have raised manifold objections to the operation of red-light cameras in 
Missouri. Washington University School of Law Professor Peter Joy, for example, commented 
that the Arnold, Missouri, ordinance requires those issued automated red-light citations to 
―basically declare your innocence . . . . In essence, it compels you to finger your wife or child or 
someone else you loaned the car to.‖ Robert Patrick, Suit Challenges Red-Light Cameras, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 27, 2008, at B1. Stephen Ryals, a local attorney and adjunct 
professor at Saint Louis University School of Law, describes citations generated from red-light 
cameras as ―offensive to anyone who cares about the Constitution,‖ given their due process 
implications. Chad Garrison, Red Alert: Everything They Really Don’t Want You to Know 
About Those Pesky Traffic-Light Cameras, The Riverfront Times Online, Mar. 5, 2008, http:// 
www.riverfronttimes.com/2008-03-05/news/red-alert-st-louis-officials-really-don-t-want-you-to 
-know-too-much-about-those-pesky-traffic-light-cameras/. Other local attorneys have decried 
the revenue stream generated by red-light cameras, alternatively describing them as ―a great 
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and citizens‘ advocacy groups16 who are seeing red on account of 
red-light cameras, most courts have hesitated to award relief to 
plaintiffs challenging the cameras‘ legality. 
This Note posits that red-light cameras dangerously reverse the 
presumption of innocence and deprive cited motorists of the 
fundamental right to confront their accusers. Cogent analysis of these 
weighty claims requires a narrowing of the field, both substantively 
and geographically. Though similar critiques may be mounted against 
other forms of automated enforcement technology,
17
 this Note 
focuses specifically on the constitutional implications of red-light 
cameras presently operating in Saint Louis, Missouri. Employing 
Saint Louis as an exemplar is useful in several ways. Unlike some 
communities throughout the region and nation, Saint Louis has not 
adopted other forms of automated traffic enforcement (e.g., 
photographic speed radar),
18
 rendering local law and commentary 
uniquely riveted on red-light cameras. Moreover, Saint Louis-area 
municipalities are the most active in Missouri—and among the most 
active in the nation—in adopting red-light camera ordinances.19 
Though this Note views red-light cameras‘ legality through the lens 
of Missouri law, the analysis is capable of extrapolation to other 
states‘ red-light schemas to the extent that they parallel Missouri‘s 
system. 
 
way to raise revenue for the city‖ and ―part of [Saint Louis‘s] broader scheme to defraud 
plaintiffs . . . by collecting fines when they could never prove a violation.‖ Id. 
 15. See Jo Mannies, Lembke Takes on Red-Light Cameras, Also Continues Battle Against 
Lawyers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 2009, at D4 (quoting Missouri State Senator Jim 
Lembke‘s description of automated red-light enforcement systems as ―an example of big 
government and ‗Big Brother‘ at its worst.‖). 
 16. See infra note 71. 
 17. See, e.g., Kevin P. Shannon, Note, Speeding towards [sic] Disaster: How Cleveland’s 
Traffic Cameras Violate the Ohio Constitution, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607, 611–13 (2007) 
(raising objections to automated speed cameras based on Ohio constitutional principles). 
 18. Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Communities Using Red Light and/or Speed 
Cameras as of September 2009, http://www.iihs.org/research/topics/auto_enforce_cities.html 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2009) (revealing that no Saint Louis communities have turned to speed 
cameras to buffer their enforcement efforts). 
 19. Id.; POI Factory—Red Light & Speed Cameras, http://www.poi-factory.com/poifiles/ 
us/red-light-cameras (last visited Feb. 24, 2010) (listing the ―St. Louis Metro Area‖ as having 
the tenth-highest number of red-light cameras in the United States, trailing Los Angeles; 
Washington, D.C.; Chicago; New York City; Dallas; Phoenix; Baltimore; Houston; and San 
Francisco).  
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Part I.A reviews the historical origins and jurisprudential 
development of two due process claims upon which courts might 
invalidate red-light camera ordinances: the presumption of innocence 
and the right to confrontation. With this constitutional context in 
mind, Part I.B–D tracks the history of automated enforcement 
technology in the United States, including legal challenges to red-
light cameras and their predecessors. Part II analyzes the due process 
implications of red-light cameras and proposes that Missouri courts 
should extend their own relevant precedents and adopt those of other 
state courts addressing red-light camera ordinances and related 
schemas. On due process principles, Missouri courts should refuse to 
enforce local ordinances authorizing the installation and operation of 
red-light cameras. 
I. HISTORY 
A. Due Process Foundations 
As a fundamental precept of American law, all citizens are 
protected against deprivation of life, liberty, and property without due 
process of law
20—a principle that is deeply rooted in our legal 
culture.
21
 With phraseology mirroring that of Magna Carta,
22
 the Fifth 
Amendment‘s due process protections were ratified by State 
legislatures for inclusion in the federal Constitution with relatively 
little controversy.
23
 Reaffirming the over-arching importance of 
 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that ―no person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.‖). 
 21. ―[T]he existence of eight state bills of rights with constitutional status invigorated 
Anti-Federalist arguments that a bill of rights should be appended to the Constitution of 1787.‖ 
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 11 (1999).  
 22. Alfred H. Kelly, Where Constitutional Liberty Came From, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
FREEDOM IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 13, 46 (Alfred H. Kelly ed., 1958). Kelly notes 
that ―[t]he provision in the Fifth Amendment that no person should be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law was a variation of the ancient ‗law of the land‘ phrase 
handed down through English and American charters from Magna Charta.‖ See also ALBERT H. 
PUTNEY, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW 371 (1908). Putney concludes 
that ―[t]he provision that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law, is . . . a reaffirmation of common law principles. The germ of this principle is 
found in the thirty-ninth chapter of the Magna Charta . . . .‖ Id. 
 23. James Madison, then a member of the House of Representatives, ―took the lead in 
coordinating the various state proposals and introducing a series of proposed amendments to the 
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protecting liberty against capricious deprivation,
24
 the Reconstruction 
Congress expanded due process protections by including a matching 
clause, applicable to the States, in the Fourteenth Amendment.
25
 
Article I, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution echoes the 
command of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by guaranteeing 
procedural fairness in Missouri proceedings.
26
 
Beyond the amorphous directives of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and the Missouri Constitution, the precise dictates of 
due process are not spelled out in either Constitution‘s text.27 Over 
time, federal courts have provided important insight on the ways in 
which due process is satisfied or offended in practice. The Supreme 
Court has reasoned that it is the province of the states to articulate 
and adhere to their own judicial processes, but such province ends 
where a given procedure ―offends some principle of justice so rooted 
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.‖28 Two principles that the Court has classified as 
fundamental under the umbrella of due process are the presumption 
of innocence
29
 and the right to confront one‘s accuser.30 
 
Constitution based upon them.‖ Id. at 44. Pursuant to Article V of the United States 
Constitution, Madison‘s proposal was ratified by Congress and submitted by President 
Washington to the State legislatures in the fall of 1789. Id. at 45. Buoyed by fear that, absent a 
Bill of Rights, the newly established government would abuse its power, the States acted 
quickly to ratify the proposed amendments. Within two years, the Bill of Rights was appended 
to the original Constitution. Id. 
 24. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (noting that ―[t]he touchstone of 
due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.‖). 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (―No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.‖). See also MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 134 (1994) (stating that ―[t]he presumption should surely be 
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to limit state 
prosecutorial/adjudicatory practices and procedures to the same extent the identically worded 
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment limits federal prosecutorial/adjudicatory practices 
and procedures.‖). 
 26. Article I, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution provides that ―[n]o person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.‖ MO. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
Compare id. with U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV, § 1. 
 27. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20–21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting 
that ―‗[d]ue process‘ is, perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law—the least confined to 
history and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society.‖). 
 28. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958). 
 29. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943) (concluding that a law would be 
impermissible were it to posit that ―mere proof of the identity of the accused, should create a 
presumption of the existence of all the facts essential to guilt.‖); McFarland v. Am. Sugar Ref. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/13
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1. The Presumption of Innocence as a Feature of Due Process 
Included among the bedrock guarantees of due process is the 
presumption of innocence favoring the accused.
31
 So fundamental is 
this presumption that the Supreme Court has described it as ―the 
undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary‖32 and ―established beyond 
legislative contravention in the Due Process Clause.‖33 Steeped in 
Roman legal tradition,
34
 the presumption of innocence applies to 
procedures governing traffic infractions just as it does to other classes 
of cases.
35
 Though the presumption of innocence applies in judicial 
proceedings, legislatures are entitled to include statutory rebuttable 
presumptions to the opposite effect so long as such presumptions are 
not, in operation, conclusive.
36
 The lawfulness of a rebuttable 
presumption is gauged according to the strength of the presumption‘s 
 
Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916) (holding that ―it is not within the province of a legislature to 
declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.‖). 
 30. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (holding that citizens accused of criminal 
wrongdoing in state courts are ―entitled to be tried in accordance with the protection of the 
confrontation guarantee of the Sixth Amendment‖ and acknowledging that ―that guarantee, like 
the right against compelled self-incrimination, is ‗to be enforced against the States under the 
Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights 
against federal encroachment.‘‖). 
 31. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (warning that ―courts must carefully 
guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt‖); Donald A. Gillies, Comment, The Presumption of Innocence; Its 
Applicability to Prosecutions for Speeding Violations, 47 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 64, 64 
(1956–57) (describing the presumption of innocence as ―a keystone‖ in American law). 
 32. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963), provides further support for this proposition. In describing why the constitutional 
promise of a right to counsel is applicable to the States, the Gideon Court reasoned that 
provisions of the Bill of Rights that are ―fundamental and essential to a fair trial [are] made 
obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.‖ Id. at 342. 
 33. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 763 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(describing due process as the constitutional locus of ―the invaluable guarantee afforded by the 
presumption of innocence‖). 
 34. See Coffin, 156 U.S. at 454. 
 35. City of Norfolk v. McFarland, 145 F. Supp. 258, 260 (E.D. Va. 1956). See also State 
v. Lloyd, 63 S.E.2d 150, 150–51 (N.C. 1951), in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
reasoned that mere evidence of ownership was insufficient to prove that the owner was driving 
the vehicle at the time of a traffic violation. The highway patrolman‘s failure to ascertain the 
identity of a speeding automobile ―seem[ed] lacking,‖ and as such the court reversed the 
judgment below in favor of the State. Id. 
 36. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 333 (1985). 
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rationality,
37
 with the caveat that ―any fact presumed must, for due 
process, have a natural, not an unreasonable or an unnatural, 
connection with the facts proven.‖38 In the traffic enforcement 
context, numerous state courts have reasoned that mere evidence that 
one owns a vehicle is insufficient to support the presumption that that 
person was driving the vehicle at the time of an infraction.
39
 
2. The Right to Confrontation as a Feature of Due Process 
The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 10 of the 
Missouri Constitution are not the sole mechanisms through which the 
law promises procedural fairness. The Sixth Amendment‘s 
confrontation clause grants an individual accused of criminal 
wrongdoing the right ―to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.‖40 The notion that one has a right to confront one‘s accuser in a 
court of law was valued by the States even before the ratification of 
the Bill of Rights.
41
 
As one manifestation of the procedural fairness carefully 
safeguarded by the Constitution, the right to confrontation long has 
 
 37. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467–68 (1943) (holding that ―the due process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments set limits upon the power of Congress or that 
of a state legislature to make the proof of one fact . . . evidence of the existence of the ultimate 
fact on which guilt is predicated,‖ and that ―where the inference is so strained as not to have a 
reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know them it is not competent for the 
legislature to create it as a rule governing the procedure of courts.‖). 
 38. People v. Hildebrandt, 126 N.E.2d 377, 378 (N.Y. 1955). 
 39. Id. at 379. The Court of Appeals of New York commented that ―it is going much too 
far to infer the driver‘s identity from the fact of ownership. . . . [I]t is hardly a normal or ready 
inference or deduction that an automobile which speeds along a highway is being driven by its 
owner, and by no other person.‖ Id. See also State v. Greenlick, 152 P.3d 971, 973 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2007) (holding that Oregon‘s criminal procedural assurance of a speedy trial applies to 
defendants cited for traffic infractions); State v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. 2007) 
(invalidating Minnesota red-light camera ordinances as violative of state‘s criminal procedural 
guarantee of presumption of innocence). 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 41. Kelly, supra note 22, at 27. Traceable to the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. Lindsay 
Hoopes, The Right to a Fair Trial and the Confrontation Clause: Overruling Crawford to 
Rebalance the U.S. Criminal Justice Equilibrium, 32 HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 305, 
317–19 (2009) (noting that ―[n]early every evaluation of the history and purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause starts with the infamous trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.‖). See generally Allen 
D. Boyer, The Trial of Sir Walter Ralegh [sic]: The Law of Treason, the Trial of Treason and 
the Origins of the Confrontation Clause, 74 MISS. L.J. 869 (2005). 
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been recognized by the Supreme Court and constitutional scholars as 
an important element of due process.
42
 In 1965, the Court held that 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the 
Sixth Amendment‘s confrontation clause and thereby requires States 
to afford the right to confrontation to citizens accused of criminal 
misconduct.
43
 The Missouri Constitution includes a provision that 
mirrors the Sixth Amendment‘s confrontation clause.44 Thus, 
Missouri defendants in federal and state tribunals alike enjoy the right 
to confrontation. 
B. Early Automated Enforcement Technology 
Law enforcement personnel for generations have complemented 
traditional enforcement of traffic laws with cutting-edge technology. 
Stealth traffic enforcement in the United States originated in 
Westchester County, New York, where in 1902 police began 
employing the ―time-distance method‖ of speed measurement.45 Trios 
of Westchester police officers concealed themselves in faux tree 
 
 42. Justice Douglas explicated the fundamental importance of the right to confrontation 
thusly: ―confrontation and cross-examination under oath are essential, if the American ideal of 
due process is to remain a vital force in our public life.‖ Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 351 
(1955) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55–56 (1899) 
(describing the right to confrontation of one‘s accuser as ―essential for the due protection of life 
and liberty‖). Professor Alfredo Garcia maintains that the right to confrontation is an 
indispensable element of a fair trial. ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN 
JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 71 (1992). Garcia contends that ―the denial of 
effective confrontation, especially at trial, abridges significantly a defendant‘s rights under the 
Sixth Amendment and thereby casts doubt on the fairness of the proceeding.‖ Id. Professor 
Peter Westen submits that the confrontation clause applies with particular fervor to witnesses 
who testify explicitly as to the defendant‘s guilt or innocence. Peter Westen, Confrontation and 
Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 
572 (1978). According to Professor Westen, ―the sixth amendment requires only that the 
defendant be allowed to confront those witnesses whose testimony is heard by the factfinder on 
the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.‖ Id. 
 43. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (holding ―the Sixth Amendment‘s right of an 
accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made 
obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.‖). 
 44. ―[T]he accused shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face.‖ 
MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(a). Compare id. with U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 45. See Virginia Transportation Research Council, Final Report: Automated Speed 
Enforcement Pilot Project for the Capital Beltway: Feasibility of Photo-Radar (1992), http://ntl. 
bts.gov/DOCS/ase.html. 
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trunks along well-traveled roadways:
46
 the first two officers, 
positioned one mile apart from one another, used stop watches to 
chronicle the time at which the motorist passed each ―trunk,‖ then 
telephoned that information to a third officer stationed further up the 
road, who apprehended speeding motorists.
47
  
In 1909, Massachusetts took the next step in covert traffic 
enforcement through its introduction of photo-speed recorders. These 
machines captured two images of passing locomotives—the latter 
image taken within seconds of the first.
48
 Based on the size of the 
second image (i.e., the elapsed distance between the camera and the 
vehicle), reviewing officers discerned whether drivers had been 
speeding and issued citations accordingly.
49
 The Commonwealth‘s 
photo-speed recorders prompted the first American lawsuit 
challenging (unsuccessfully) the validity of technology-based traffic 
enforcement.
50
 
Technological innovation throughout the twentieth century 
induced additional developments in traffic law enforcement. By 
1917, speedometers were commonplace, both in citizens‘ 
automobiles and police patrol vehicles,
51
 and by the 1940s, nascent 
radar technology had arrived in the United States.
52
 In the 1950s, 
New York introduced ―photo-traffic cameras‖—advanced variants of 
Massachusetts‘s photo-speed recorders capable of independent 
mathematical computation of an automobile‘s speed.53 Photo-traffic 
cameras were followed by modern photo-radar devices, which were 
first deployed stateside in Texas in 1986.
54
 These sweeping field 
developments were met with myriad legal challenges. 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW, Admissibility of Evidence § 185 (1931). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Commonwealth v. Buxton, 91 N.E. 128, 129 (Mass. 1910). The Supreme Judicial 
Court upheld the police‘s use of photo-speed recorders against Buxton‘s charge that they 
provided insufficient evidence and were inherently unreliable. Id. 
 51. EDWARD C. FISHER & ROBERT E. REEDER, VEHICLE TRAFFIC LAW 144 (1974). 
 52. See Big Brother is Driving, TIME, Nov. 23, 1953, at 28 (describing the mechanics of 
radar systems and referring to such systems as ―the unseen traffic cop‖ whose invisibility is 
reminiscent of ―the Thought Police in Orwell‘s chiller‖). 
 53. See People v. Pett, 178 N.Y.S.2d 550, 551 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1958) (describing the 
technical operation of the foto-patrol device). 
 54. Robin Miller, Annotation, Automated Traffic Enforcement Systems, 26 A.L.R.6th 179 
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In 1955, the Court of Appeals of New York entertained one such 
challenge in People v. Hildebrandt.
55
 Hildebrandt, the owner of an 
automobile caught speeding via a photo-traffic camera, was issued a 
citation by Monroe County police two weeks after the date of his 
alleged infraction.
56
 Hildebrandt maintained that the governing 
ordinance‘s rebuttable presumption—that an owner necessarily was 
operating his vehicle at the time of an infraction—was untenable 
legally.
57
 The Court of Appeals agreed, reasoning that ―it is hardly a 
normal or ready inference or deduction that an automobile which 
speeds along a highway is being driven by its owner, and by no other 
person.‖58 
New York citizens were not alone in challenging technology‘s 
influence on traffic law; Missouri courts were called upon regularly 
throughout the twentieth century to resolve traffic law-based 
disputes. While recognizing radar as a scientifically reliable police 
tool beginning in 1959,
59
 reviewing courts in Missouri consistently 
emphasized two caveats in reference to radar evidence: the radar 
device must be proven accurate at the time of the radar reading, and 
the proponent of the radar evidence bears the burden of proving such 
accuracy.
60
 Missouri courts have characterized these caveats as duties 
borne by the state whose proof is necessary for a successful 
 
(2007) (noting that La Marque and Friendswood, Texas, were the first American municipalities 
to use modern photo-radar equipment). 
 55. People v. Hildebrandt, 126 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1955). 
 56. Id. Similar to the photo-speed recorder at issue in Commonwealth v. Buxton, 91 N.E. 
128 (Mass. 1910), the device employed by the Monroe County police ―[took] two photos, at a 
set time interval apart, of a moving vehicle. The distance traveled, by the car, in that interval, 
from a fixed point, was the basis for a mathematical computation of the rate of speed.‖ 
Hildebrandt, 126 N.E.2d at 378. 
 57. Id. at 378–79. 
 58. Id. 
 59. State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188, 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). 
 60. See, e.g., State v. Calvert, 682 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Mo. 1984). In applying these rules, 
Missouri courts repeatedly have found radar evidence inadmissible on account of the state‘s 
failure to prove—through officer testimony—that the radar unit had been checked for accuracy 
at the relevant time. State v. Weatherwax, 635 S.W.2d 34, 35–36 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1982) 
(finding radar evidence inadmissible because state failed to prove that outside power lines and 
trooper‘s heater fan had not adversely affected the operation of trooper‘s radar unit); City of St. 
Louis v. Martin, 548 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (deeming radar evidence 
inadmissible where the proponent, a Saint Louis police officer, could not recall the last instance 
in which he had checked equipment‘s accuracy). 
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prosecution.
61
 Courts have explained that these caveats serve the 
important purpose of ―protect[ing] the rights of motorists against the 
possibility of error,‖62 at least in part because officers who test for 
radar accuracy on-site are able to distinguish correct from spurious 
readings.
63
 
C. Evolution of Red-Light Cameras 
Photo-traffic cameras and radar devices proved to be the 
forerunners to yet another innovation in the field of traffic law 
enforcement: the red-light camera. Red-light cameras were 
introduced in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s.
64
 By the early 1980s, 
their operation had expanded beyond European borders to 
intersections in disparate hemispheres and time zones, including 
Australia, Canada, and Israel, among others.
65
 New York City 
became the first American municipality to operate automated stop-
light enforcement systems when it launched a 1994 red-light camera 
initiative.
66
 New York‘s initiative proved to be the tip of the red-light 
camera iceberg. At present, legislatures in seventeen states either 
have enacted authorizing legislation explicitly permitting their 
 
 61. City of Jackson v. Langford, 648 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1983) (noting 
that ―the prosecution has a prima facie duty to establish that the radar unit was tested and found 
to be operating properly at the site of and reasonably close in time to the arrest.‖). 
 62. City of St. Louis v. Boecker, 370 S.W.2d 731, 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963). 
 63. Calvert, 682 S.W.2d at 478. 
 64. See GEORGE E. FRANGOS, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS OF HOWARD COUNTY, 
MD, AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT: 10-YEAR EVALUATION RED LIGHT RUNNING DETECTION: 
HOWARD COUNTY, MARYLAND 3 (2007), http://www.ite.org/meetcon/2007AM/Session_41_ 
George%20Frangos.pdf (citing 1968 as Europe‘s initial foray into red-light camera 
enforcement); Fridulv Sagberg, Automatic Enforcement Technologies and Systems (European 
Comm’n Under the Transp. RTD Programme of the 4th Framework Programme, Working 
Paper No. 7, 2000), http://virtual.vtt.fi/virtual/proj6/escape/escape_wp7.pdf (noting that 
Switzerland experimented with a red-light camera pilot program in the 1970s). 
 65. The Highway Safety Group, RLC: The Early Years 1930–1997, http://www. 
hwysafety.com/nma_rlc_timeline1.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2010). In 1981, Australia installed 
red-light cameras for study purposes. Id. At present, more than twenty countries have 
incorporated red-light cameras as part of their traffic enforcement apparatuses. See Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety, Q&As: Red Light Cameras, http://www.iihs.org/research/ 
qanda/rlr.html#cite23 (last visited Apr. 19, 2010). These countries include, among others, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the United 
Kingdom. Id. 
 66. See Miller, supra note 54. 
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municipalities to implement red-light cameras or presently are 
contemplating such legislation.
67
 While some legislatures are as yet 
undecided on the merits of statewide authorizing legislation, five 
states have expressly prohibited municipalities from enacting red-
light camera ordinances.
68
 Still other states have approved red-light 
camera programs in the past but have declined to renew the programs 
upon assessing their ineffectiveness.
69
 Today, red-light cameras 
operate in more than four hundred American communities.
70
 
Despite many citizens‘ deep dissatisfaction with red-light 
cameras,
71
 municipalities continue to experiment with the 
 
 67. Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Red Light Enforcement Camera Resources: 
Informational Briefs, Overview, http://www.iihs.org/laws/automated_enforcement.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2010). 
 68. See id. Nevada, for example, has prohibited the use of imaging equipment unless such 
equipment is hand-held by a police officer. Id. West Virginia disallows all forms of 
photographic law enforcement. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., Rebecca Kimitch, Cities Seeing Little Profit from Red Light Cameras, 
WHITTIER DAILY NEWS, Oct. 25, 2008 (noting the El Monte City Council‘s decision to 
discontinue the city‘s red-light camera program on account of its general ineffectiveness). See 
also Barbara Langland-Orban et al., Red Light Running Cameras: Would Crashes, Injuries and 
Automobile Insurance Rates Increase If They Are Used in Florida?, 5 FLA. PUB. HEALTH REV. 
1 (2008) (noting, inter alia, that ―comprehensive studies conclude cameras actually increase 
crashes and injuries, providing a safety argument not to install them,‖ and concluding, ―the 
majority of the red light running safety issue can be resolved through inexpensive engineering 
remedies that address infractions in the first second after the light changes‖). 
 70. Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Communities Using Red Light Cameras as of 
February 2010, http://www.iihs.org/research/topics/auto_enforce_list.html (last visited Apr. 19, 
2010). Among the major American cities with fully operational red-light camera programs are: 
Atlanta, Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia, San Diego, San 
Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. Id. 
 71. One frustrated group of citizens in Arnold, Missouri, has organized a political action 
committee under the moniker ―Don‘t Tread on Me.‖ The group‘s mission is to rid the city of 
red-light cameras. Christine Byers, Arnold City Council Tables Discussion on Red Light 
Cameras, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 9, 2009, at B7. Despite the group‘s collection of 
nearly 1,000 signatures as a means of initiating a local referendum, the Arnold City Council 
tabled discussion of the issue for six months. Id. Don‘t Tread on Me is one among many groups 
of citizens embracing the ballot initiative process and other creative forms of civil disobedience 
as a means of communicating their dissatisfaction with red-light cameras. In response to the 
rapid expansion of red-light cameras in College Station, Texas, for example, aggravated citizen 
Jim Ash has endeavored to provide Garmin GPS updates to any interested motorist, apprising 
the driver any time he or she comes within 400 feet of a red-light camera. Civil Violation Home 
Page, http://www.civilviolation.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2009). See also Mark Toljagic, 
World at Your Fingertips: You Don’t Need a Pricey Car or On-Dash Unit to Own a GPS, Just 
a BlackBerry and a Plan, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 7, 2009, at W23 (―The latest generation of GPS 
devices offers a mind-boggling array of information for the traveller, including live traffic 
warnings, gas station and bank locations, and identifying red-light cameras and radar traps.‖). 
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technology.
72
 The prevalence of red-light cameras has prompted 
litigation in both state and federal courts. Litigants have sought relief 
from automated citations on a variety of legal theories,
73
 including on 
due process grounds.
74
 Generally, federal courts have avoided 
detailed consideration of the constitutional implications of red-light 
cameras, relying instead on narrow procedural grounds as the bases 
of their decisions.
75
 State courts have shown a greater willingness to 
decide red-light camera cases on the merits but have split on their 
legality.
76
 A recent decision from Minnesota exemplifies one side of 
this split. 
 
Frustrated citizens elsewhere have resorted to such self-help measures as destroying red-light 
cameras with pick axes and blocking lenses‘ views with inflatable Santa Clauses. William M. 
Bulkeley, Get the Feeling You’re Being Watched? If You’re Driving, You Just Might Be, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 27, 2009, at A1. 
 72. Julie Ann Grimm, Red-Light Camera Deal Advances, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Jan. 
21, 2009, at C1 (describing Santa Fe, New Mexico‘s, preparations for first automated traffic 
enforcement system); Lynn Horsley, Red Light Cameras in KC Are Expected Next Year, THE 
KANSAS CITY STAR, Dec. 2, 2008, at B2 (chronicling Kansas City, Missouri‘s, exploration and 
pending installation of red-light camera system). 
 73. Bradley Olson, Critics Claim HPD Tried to Skew Red-Light Study, HOU. CHRON, Jan. 
29, 2009, at B1 (describing open records lawsuit filed against city of Houston, Texas, in which 
plaintiffs allege that the Houston Police Department purposefully skewed red-light camera data 
in order to encourage the city to retain the cameras).  
 74. City of Duluth v. Morgan, 651 S.E.2d 475, 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Agomo v. Fenty, 
916 A.2d 181, 183 (D.C. 2007); Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702, 707 (M.D. 
N.C. 2003). 
 75. Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-400, 2008 WL 782540, at *2 
n.1 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008) (granting defendants‘ motions for summary judgment, given 
plaintiffs‘ lack of standing); Holst v. City of Portland, 152 Fed. Appx. 588 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(affirming District Court‘s conclusion that motorist alleging 42 U.S.C. § 1983 injury stemming 
from red-light camera citation failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted); 
Shavitz, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 710 (finding, inter alia, that plaintiff challenging red-light camera 
schema lacked standing to litigate the claim); Dajani v. Governor of Md., No. CCB-00-713, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 982 (D. Md. Jan. 24, 2001) (declining to review Maryland state courts‘ 
decisions on Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment questions for lack of federal jurisdiction). But 
see Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009). The Seventh Circuit disposed 
on the merits a challenge to Chicago‘s red-light camera ordinance by holding, in reference to 
the ordinance‘s $90 citation fee, that ―the Supreme Court has never held that a property interest 
so modest is a fundamental right.‖ Id. at 566. Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged 
that State law might provide solace for aggrieved plaintiffs. Id. at 3. 
 76. Compare City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Iowa 2008) (holding 
that Davenport‘s automated traffic enforcement ordinance is valid under Iowa law), and State v. 
Dahl, 87 P.3d 650 (Or. 2004) (upholding Oregon municipality‘s red-light camera ordinance, 
including civil statutory presumption that registered owners are drivers of vehicles at any given 
time), with People v. Fischetti, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 186 (Cal. App. Dep‘t Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2008) 
(invalidating citations issued via automated red-light enforcement system on the grounds that 
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In 2007, the Minnesota Supreme Court broke jurisprudential 
ground when, in State v. Kuhlman,
77
 it invalidated Minneapolis‘s red-
light camera ordinance. Responding to his receipt of an automated 
citation, Kuhlman, a Minneapolis resident, raised a facial challenge to 
the authorizing ordinance, arguing that it conflicted with state law on 
traffic regulation and violated his due process rights.
78
 Regarding the 
preemption claim, the court agreed that the local ordinance conflicted 
with state law.
79
 On the due process question, the court held that 
Minnesota‘s rules of criminal procedure ―specifically apply to petty 
misdemeanors. And those rules require that a defendant be ‗presumed 
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.‘‖80 The court 
concluded that red-light cameras deprive motorists of this 
presumption, effectively forcing vehicle owners to work backward 
from the presumption of guilt.
81
 In light of its constitutional 
deficiencies, the Minneapolis ordinance was deemed invalid.
82
 
D. Red-Light Cameras in Saint Louis 
Missouri has no statewide legislation authorizing or prohibiting 
municipal operation of red-light cameras.
83
 Indeed, Missouri‘s 
statutory schema is silent as to red-light cameras.
84
 The twenty-six 
Saint Louis-area communities with red-light cameras each have 
authorized their operation sua sponte.
85
 Reviewing the constitutional 
 
such citations failed to comply with statutory warning period), and State v. Kuhlman, 729 
N.W.2d 577 (Minn. 2007) (holding that Minneapolis‘s automated photo-enforcement ordinance 
violates Minnesota law). 
 77. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d at 578 (Minn. 2007). 
 78. Id. at 578–79. 
 79. Id. at 583. The court noted that ―taking the state‘s argument to its logical conclusion, a 
city could extend liability to owners for any number of traffic offenses as to which the Act 
places liability only on drivers.‖ Id. This effectively allows municipalities to supersede the 
dictates of state law. Id. 
 80. Id. at 584. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, supra note 67. 
 84. See MO. REV. STAT. § 304.001 (2008) (defining terms of art used in Chapter 304 such 
as ―Traffic Regulations,‖ but not indicating whether red-light cameras are contemplated as 
―traffic-control devices‖). 
 85. Saint Louis area communities with red-light camera ordinances include Arnold, 
Brentwood, Creve Coeur, Florissant, Hazelwood, Saint Charles, Saint Louis County, 
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principles and statutory commands to which Missouri red-light 
camera ordinances must conform illuminates the broader legal 
context within which they operate. As part of their inherent police 
powers, state and local governments retain the province to regulate 
public roadways,
86
 but such province is not limitless. Just as federal 
law supersedes conflicting state and local laws,
87
 a Missouri 
municipality‘s dominion exists only to the extent that its ordinances 
cohere with federal and state constitutional and statutory law.
88
 
Preemption principles apply with equal force to traffic ordinances as 
they do to other incidents of local law. Missouri courts have 
acknowledged, for example, that ―the City of St. Louis does have the 
right to regulate and control by ordinance the use of its streets. But 
such ordinances must not be in conflict with the general laws of the 
state.‖89 
 
Washington, and Wentzville. Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, supra note 70.  
 86. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523 (1959) (recognizing that ―[t]he 
power of the State to regulate the use of its highways is broad and pervasive.‖). 
 87. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause commands that ―[t]his Constitution, 
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . .‖ Id. See also Paul 
Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (2007) (acknowledging that ―city 
ordinances, like state laws, are subject to federal preemption . . . .‖). 
 88. MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a). The Missouri Constitution commands that local 
governments may exercise municipal authority ―provided such powers are consistent with the 
constitution of this state and are not limited or denied . . . by statute.‖ Id. Missouri courts have 
acknowledged that local governments: 
. . . may enact regulations that supplement or enlarge upon provisions of a state statute 
by requiring more than what is required in the statute. However, when the expressed or 
implied provisions of the local regulation and the state statute are inconsistent and in 
irreconcilable conflict, then the local regulation is void. 
St. Charles County Ambulance Dist. v. Town of Dardenne Prairie, 39 S.W.3d 67, 69 (Mo. Ct. 
App. E.D. 2001). 
 89. City of St. Louis v. Stenson, 333 S.W.2d 529, 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960). The Court of 
Criminal Correction below found a truck driver guilty under a Saint Louis ordinance stipulating 
the maximum length of commercial trucks and accordingly assessed a twenty-five dollar fine 
against the driver. Id. at 530–31. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the ordinance at 
issue was preempted by Missouri statutory law. Id. at 533–34 (―The ordinance just mentioned is 
in direct conflict with the acts of the Legislature mentioned, and is repealed by necessary 
implication.‖). 
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1. Missouri‘s Statutory Framework for Traffic Regulation 
By statute, Missouri grants local governments broad regulatory 
authority over traffic matters, subject to compliance with general 
statutory directives.
90
 In reference to red-light violations, Missouri 
law requires drivers to completely stop at red lights and to remain 
stopped until an indication to proceed is shown.
91
 Missouri 
categorizes red-light violations as class C misdemeanors.
92
 
Misdemeanors of all classes are governed by the Missouri Rules of 
Criminal Procedure,
93
 under which citizens are afforded the full 
complement of procedural protections available in Missouri‘s 
criminal tribunals.
94
 
2. History and Content of Saint Louis Red-Light Camera 
Ordinances 
Municipalities in the greater Saint Louis area have installed red-
light cameras at a particularly high frequency.
95
 Arnold, a southwest 
suburb of Saint Louis, was the first area municipality to install and 
operate red-light cameras, beginning in 2005.
96
 Arnold‘s ordinance, 
 
 90. See generally MO. REV. STAT. § 304.010 (2008). 
 91. MO. REV. STAT. § 304.281.1(3)(a) (2000). See also Newell v. Peters, 406 S.W.2d 814, 
818 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966), in which the Court of Appeals noted that ―[t]he steady red light is not 
merely a warning, advising the motorist to be watchful and ever on the alert; it addresses itself 
to him in compelling language. Its command to him is imperious: ‗Do not proceed!‘‖ 
 92. MO. REV. STAT. § 304.361 (2000) (―Any person who violates any of the provisions of 
sections 304.271 to 304.351 is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not 
less than five dollars nor more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail 
not exceeding one year or by both such fine and imprisonment.‖) (emphasis added). See also 
MO. REV. STAT. § 304.351 (2008). Each section of Chapter 304 pertaining to traffic signals 
provides that violation thereof is a class C misdemeanor. Id. § 304. 
 93. MO. REV. STAT. § 543.220.1 (2000). ―All proceedings upon the trial of misdemeanors 
and infractions before associate circuit judges shall be governed by the practice in criminal 
cases before circuit judges . . . .‖ Id. 
 94. MO. R. CRIM. P. 19.01, entitled ―Misdemeanors or Felonies Rules When Applicable,‖ 
states that ―[r]ules 19 to 36, inclusive, govern the procedure in all courts of this state having 
jurisdiction of criminal proceedings.‖ See also State ex rel. Sanders v. Sauer, 183 S.W.3d 238, 
243 (Mo. 2006) (White, J., dissenting). Judge White, harkening to Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 
103, 123 (1990), noted that a Missouri citizen charged with a misdemeanor enjoyed the full 
complement of criminal procedural protections. Id. 
 95. See infra note 104. 
 96. Lynn Horsley, Caught Red Handed? Although Red-Light Cameras Haven’t Gotten an 
OK in Kansas, Some Missouri Cities Are Installing Them, THE KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr. 1, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
460 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 32:443 
 
 
after which other local governments have modeled their own red-
light camera laws, provides that ―[a] rebuttable presumption exists 
that the owner of a motor vehicle operated or used in violation of this 
division was the driver of the vehicle at the time and place the 
violation was captured by a recorded image.‖97 At present, over one 
hundred red-light cameras are operating in the Saint Louis 
metropolitan area.
98
 The burgeoning incidence of camera-issued 
tickets has drawn the ire of many Saint Louis motorists,
99
 but 
government officials generally have been non-responsive to their 
complaints.
100
 Nonetheless, the influx of red-light ordinances has not 
garnered universal approval, even among lawmakers. 
In 2006, when Missouri communities‘ experimentation with red-
light cameras was in its infancy, Missouri State Senator Jason 
 
2006, at A1 (describing Arnold‘s October 2005 introduction of red-light cameras and the 
looming prospect of Kansas City-area cities following suit). See also ARNOLD, MO., CODE 
§ 23–183 (2006). The ordinance provides:  
(a) If the city proves: (1) That a motor vehicle was being operated or used; (2) That the 
operation or use of the motor vehicle was in violation of section 23-173; and (3) That 
the defendant is the owner of the motor vehicle, then: (b) A rebuttable presumption 
exists that the owner of a motor vehicle operated or used in violation of this division 
was the driver of the vehicle at the time and place the violation was captured by a 
recorded image. 
Id. 
 97. ARNOLD, MO., CODE § 23–183 (2006). 
 98. See PhotoEnforced.com, http://www.photoenforced.com/us.html (last visited Apr. 19, 
2010), which provides locations of automated enforcement systems by type (e.g., automated 
radar, red-light camera) state, and locality. 
 99. One group, Missourians Against Red Light Cameras, has initiated a grassroots 
campaign specifically focused on ridding ―the City of St. Louis—and eventually the entire 
state—of the monumental violation of our civil liberties that is the red light camera scheme.‖ 
See Missourians Against Red Light Cameras Facebook Group (local citizens‘ advocacy group 
home page), http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=63319253360 (last visited Apr. 19, 
2010). 
 100. Jake Wagman, City’s Red-Light Cameras Lacked Signs for Months, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, July 19, 2009, at A14. Wagman notes:  
. . . for months [after installation of red-light cameras], St. Louis officials did not 
follow the city‘s own laws regarding proper notice for the traffic cameras. . . . In 
February, city aldermen approved a bill requiring a warning sign at every traffic light 
with a red-light camera. The proposal was signed into law shortly afterward by Mayor 
Francis Slay. City officials, however, did not follow through. The warnings were never 
posted. The Street Department did not even begin to create the signs until asked 
recently about their absence by the Post-Dispatch. 
Id. 
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Crowell sponsored a bill that would have invalidated existing red-
light camera ordinances and precluded future authorization.
101
 
Though his endeavor was unsuccessful, Senator Crowell is not alone 
in his belief that red-light cameras are legally problematic. In his 
former capacity as the state‘s Attorney General, Missouri Governor 
Jay Nixon publicly opined that the photographic evidence produced 
by red-light cameras is inadmissible in court.
102
 On January 20, 2009, 
Missouri State Senator Jim Lembke introduced a bill that would 
revive Senator Crowell‘s proposal by amending the Missouri code to 
prohibit the use of automated red-light enforcement systems.
103
 
Public officials like Governor Nixon and Senators Crowell and 
Lembke have remained in the political minority, as area 
municipalities have continued to warm to the idea of red-light 
cameras.
104
 As yet, Missouri courts have avoided ruling on the merits 
of a case challenging a red-light camera ordinance.
105
 A 2009 
 
 101. See Jake Wagman, Lights, Camera, Traffic Ticket, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 
26, 2006, at A1 (describing Senator Crowell‘s proposed bill and citing the Senator‘s belief that 
motorists ―should be ticketed for the way they drive, not what they own‖). 
 102. See Shane Graber, Nixon Questions Use of Traffic Photographs, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 9, 2005, at B1. Then-Attorney General Nixon expressed skepticism whether 
―taking someone's picture rolling through a stop light is adequate evidence in and of itself to 
uphold a state traffic law.‖ Id. He noted that ―[a] picture may be worth a thousand words, but a 
picture in and of itself is not a conviction.‖ Id. 
 103. See S.B. 211, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009), http://www.senate.mo. 
gov/09info/pdf-bill/intro/SB211.pdf. Saint Louis Board of Aldermen President Lewis Reed has 
joined Senator Lembke in calling for greater regulation of Missouri red-light cameras. The 
same week that Senator Lembke introduced his prohibitory legislation, President Reed 
submitted a local proposal that would require Saint Louis intersections with automated red-light 
enforcement systems to provide ―conspicuous postings‖ that the intersection is camera-
monitored. Jake Wagman, Reed Wants Advanced Warning on Red-Light Traffic Cameras, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 28, 2009. 
 104. See Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, supra note 70. In addition to Arnold, Saint 
Louis-area municipalities Bel-Nor, Bellerive Acres, Beverly Hills, Brentwood, Bridgeton, 
Calverton Park, Clayton, Country Club Hills, Creve Coeur, Dellwood, Edmundson, Ellisville, 
Florissant, Hazelwood, Moline Acres, Northwoods, Oak Grove, Richmond Heights, Saint Ann, 
Saint Charles, Saint John, Saint Louis City, Sugar Creek, and Webster Groves have installed 
red-light camera systems. See Ray Hartmann, Bad Photo Op, ST. LOUIS MAG., May 2009, at 
66, 68. 
 105. A Westlaw search of ―red light camera‖ in the ―MO-CS‖ database, which contains 
decisions from the Missouri Supreme Court since 1821 and decisions from the Missouri Courts 
of Appeals since 1876, yielded zero results. Westlaw, http://www.westlaw.com (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2009). 
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challenge to Arnold‘s red-light camera ordinance in federal district 
court was dismissed on procedural grounds.
106
 
II. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
A. Analysis 
Unlike comparable laws in other states,
107
 Missouri 
municipalities‘ red-light camera ordinances have received neither 
official endorsement nor official rejection from state lawmakers.
108
 
Without legislative or judicial guidance as to whether red-light 
cameras are lawful, the legality of municipalities‘ authorizing 
ordinances remains an open question. Given the state‘s status both as 
a relative newcomer to the field and as a judicial clean slate, Missouri 
courts are well-positioned to review red-light cameras with a fresh 
perspective. This perspective should be informed by three 
considerations: the role of state law in preempting local ordinances; 
the presumption that one is innocent until otherwise proven; and the 
right to confrontation. 
1. Missouri Statutory Law Preempts Red-Light Camera 
Ordinances 
It is an unassailable principle that local ordinances may not 
contravene state statutory provisions addressing the same subject.
109
 
It follows that Missouri municipalities seeking to enforce red-light 
camera ordinances must ensure that such ordinances cohere with the 
state‘s existing regulation of traffic laws. In Missouri, such 
regulations include by incorporation criminal procedural safeguards. 
Though class C misdemeanors generally are considered minimal 
infractions, the Missouri legislature has dictated that all 
 
 106. Hoekstra v. City of Arnold, No. 4:08CV0267, 2009 WL 259857 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 3, 
2009). 
 107. Supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 108. See MO. REV. STAT. § 304.001 (describing Missouri statutory silence regarding red-
light cameras). See also supra note 105 (demonstrating that Missouri courts have yet to 
entertain a suit on the merits of red-light cameras). 
 109. Supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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misdemeanors are treated as criminal for procedural purposes.
110
 
Mirroring the nexus between local ordinances and superseding state 
law, state rules of criminal procedure must be consistent with federal 
criminal procedural safeguards, lest they be preempted.
111
 By 
syllogism, valid municipal ordinances in Missouri may not impinge 
federal criminal procedural safeguards, including the presumption of 
innocence and the right to confrontation. 
2. Red-Light Cameras Reverse the Presumption of Innocence 
The majority of red-light cameras operating in Saint Louis 
intentionally are positioned to photograph an offending vehicle‘s rear 
license plate—not the offending vehicle‘s driver.112 The ensuing 
digital evidence constitutes the entirety of the state‘s case against 
ticketed vehicle owners.
113
 Compounding this mechanical concern, 
Saint Louis-area camera ordinances explicitly presume that 
ownership of a vehicle is conflatable with driving the vehicle at a 
given time.
114
 Though rebuttable in name, this presumption is 
conclusive in practice. Vehicle owners are forced to reconstruct 
history and disprove the preordained conclusion that they are guilty 
of the cited offense. In other words, upon mere issuance of an 
automated red-light citation, the state‘s burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the driver‘s culpability is extinguished. With red-
light camera citations, the burden shifts to the driver to prove that he 
is not guilty of the offense.
115
 
Shell games of this sort flagrantly contravene due process and are 
constitutionally untenable. Rebuttable presumptions have a place in 
 
 110. Supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540 
(E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008). The court noted that, ―[i]f the penalty is indeed criminal, then a 
panoply of federal constitutional rights, including rights to confrontation and rights against self-
incrimination, arise.‖ Id. at 4. 
 112. Supra note 8. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 115. To borrow from a familiar refrain in individual rights jurisprudence, one might 
characterize the ―rebuttable‖ presumption in red-light camera ordinances as ―rebuttable in 
theory, conclusive in fact.‖ See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (quoting the conventional wisdom that strict scrutiny review is ―strict in theory, but 
fatal in fact.‖). 
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criminal law, but such presumptions in red-light camera ordinances 
exceed their proper scope. As the Minnesota Supreme Court aptly 
noted in Kuhlman, ―in any prosecution under the [Minneapolis 
ordinance], the state has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the owner was driving at the time of the red-light offense, 
and the owner has no obligation to prove anything.‖116 Missouri law, 
like that of Minnesota, mandates that individuals accused of traffic 
offenses be afforded criminal due process protections, including the 
presumption of innocence.
117
 Red-light camera ordinances cannot, 
consistently with federal and state constitutional law, presume 
vehicle owners‘ guilt. 
The state‘s interest in enforcing traffic laws should be to punish 
and deter individual wrongdoing.
118
 Red-light camera ordinances 
punish indeed, but there is no assurance that such punishment accrues 
to the guilty party, nor is there conclusive proof that red-light 
cameras in fact enhance community safety.
119
 As the New York 
Court of Appeals eloquently noted in Hildebrandt, automated 
enforcement technology ―may be efficient and scientifically 
trustworthy, its use may make pursuit and immediate arrest 
inconvenient or unnecessary, and highway safety may be promoted 
by eliminating such pursuits. But it takes more than necessity to 
validate a presumption in a criminal case.‖120 
3. Red-Light Cameras Deprive Motorists of the Right to 
Confrontation 
Among the principal virtues of red-light cameras, from the 
perspective of law enforcement personnel, is the administrative 
facility with which the cameras operate. Be that as it may, due 
process commands that individuals accused of criminal wrongdoing 
have the right to confront their accusers. This is problematic when the 
accuser is a camera, whose digital testimony is the sole evidentiary 
 
 116. State v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d 577, 584 (Minn. 2007). See also supra notes 77–81 
and accompanying text. 
 117. Supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
 118. See generally People v. Hildebrandt, 126 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1955). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Hildebrandt, 126 N.E.2d at 379. 
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basis of a red-light prosecution.
121
 Decades before red-light cameras 
infiltrated the United States, the New York Court of Appeals 
identified a peculiar externality of automated enforcement 
technology. The Hildebrandt court noted that ―speeders are usually 
pursued and arrested after pursuit, whereas this identity question 
arises because of the use of a photographic speed recorded, without 
pursuit or arrest.‖122 
Missouri courts need look no further than their own jurisprudence 
to find a longstanding reverence for personal interaction between the 
accused motorist and the arresting law enforcement officer. Missouri 
courts long have held that radar devices must be proven accurate at 
the time of the radar reading, and the proponent of the radar evidence 
bears the burden of proving such accuracy.
123
 This logic should apply 
with equal force to contemporary forms of automated technology. 
B. Proposal 
Faithfulness to foundational constitutional promises militates 
against continued enforcement of red-light camera ordinances. Courts 
reviewing legal challenges to automated citations are well served to 
review both the red-light camera precedents established by other state 
courts and Missouri courts‘ disposition of analogous cases involving 
radar detectors and other forms of automated enforcement 
technology. Such precedents provide an analytical template for 
processing red-light ordinances consistent with constitutional 
principle. Missouri courts need not blaze new trails; on principles of 
due process, preemption, and stare decisis, Missouri courts can and 
should conclude that red-light cameras do not satisfy constitutional 
scrutiny. Extending their own jurisprudence in analogous cases and 
 
 121. See Valerie Alvord, Motorists Race to Court to Challenge Red-Light Cameras, USA 
TODAY, July 6, 2001, at 3A. 
 122. Hildebrandt, 126 N.E.2d at 379 (emphasis added). Likewise, other state courts have 
recognized the importance of on-site monitoring to ensure the accuracy and fairness of citation-
issuance. See, e.g., State v. Lloyd, 63 S.E.2d 150, 150–51 (N.C. 1951) (reversing reckless 
driving conviction in light of police officers‘ failure to visually ascertain the identity of the 
driver of vehicle registered to defendant vehicle-owner). 
 123. Supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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following the emerging precedents from other jurisdictions, Missouri 
courts should refuse to enforce red-light camera ordinances. 
CONCLUSION 
Municipalities‘ burgeoning reliance on red-light camera 
technology in lieu of traditional patrolling elicits practical and legal 
questions worthy of careful scrutiny. Absent legislative or judicial 
intervention, red-light cameras‘ continued presence seems assured. 
Automated enforcement of this sort raises significant constitutional 
red flags; red-light cameras‘ validity is questionable under both 
general constitutional principles and the expanding jurisprudential 
frameworks established by state courts assessing similar schemas. 
Red-light cameras unduly impede constitutional liberty by depriving 
motorists of their Fifth Amendment presumption of innocence and 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and as such should not 
enjoy protection from Missouri courts. 
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